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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The relatively new Financial Services Association (FSA) model was developed to 
address many of the issues related to access to financial services in rural financial 
markets in Africa. An FSA is a shareholder-based entity that operates at community level 
and provides credit and savings services to its members. The principal strengths of the 
FSA model are: 
i) FSAs are relatively low-cost and efficient, and can operate sustainably in low 
income, small or remote rural communities. 
ii) FSAs presently function with more streamlined support structures than the more 
complex support networks and apex structures of other financial service models 
for rural areas (such as savings and credit cooperatives). 
iii) The link between voting rights and size of shareholding offers the potential to 
address governance problems often encountered by credit unions and savings 
and credit cooperatives, which tend to be borrower-driven and can suffer from 
poor governance and unrepresentative management. 
iv) The scope for introducing a profit-related incentive structure, affecting staff 
(through wages), board and committee members (through profit-based 
remuneration), and all members (through dividends), could promote sustainability 
and good asset management. 
v) The FSAs' solid equity base gives them a comparative advantage over many 
other rural financial service providers in developing linkages with the banking 
sector. 
FSAs nevertheless do face significant problems, such as: 
i) A risk of capture by dominant interests, who can manipulate a lack of awareness 
on the part of shareholders of their responsibilities and powers. 
ii) Limited scale, and restricted funds for lending. 
iii) An emerging tendency towards poor portfolio quality in many FSAs. 
iv) Limited product offerings and low outreach to poorer members of the community. 
v) Uncertainty concerning their legal status that hampers their ability to act as true 
financial intermediaries. 
At this early stage of development of the FSA model, a number of questions remain: 
What are the most appropriate products for FSA clients? Can FSAs operate effectively 
in competitive environments? How can FSAs link to formal sector financial institutions 
for mutual benefit? What is the most appropriate legal and regulatory structure for 
FSAs? Are FSAs able to function sustainably without continued technical assistance? 
Perhaps some of the more interesting outstanding issues relate to the role of donors in 
the future of FSAs. To date, the development of FSAs has relied on donor support and 
involvement. The FSA model is proving less effective in solving governance and portfolio 
quality problems than was at first hoped. Analysis is needed to determine whether 
providing further assistance would be cost effective. Individual FSAs are limited in size, 
and the resulting outcomes and impacts need to be weighed against the investment. 
Donors and other interested investors need to decide whether the FSA model offers 
sufficient advantages in terms of developing rural financial markets and providing access 
to financial services in unbanked rural communities to merit the required technical 
assistance costs and investment. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Identifying replicable mechanisms for providing rural financial services on a sustainable 
basis in the more remote rural areas of sub-Saharan Africa remains a challenge. An 
environment characterised by poor communications infrastructure, low population 
density, high levels of illiteracy, low profitability and/or high risk of most rural economic 
activities, and relatively undiversified rural economies, is unattractive to formal financial 
institutions. As a result, rural clients tend to turn to locally-based informal sources of 
financial services, such as family, friends, moneylenders, self-help groups and savings 
clubs. Such sources, however, tend to be limited in scale (both geographically and 
financially), only lend for short periods of time, and in some cases charge very high rates 
of interest. Livestock, jewellery, and even social relations offer proxy savings and 
insurance services, but pose serious liquidity and divisibility issues. 
The prominent challenge for such rural areas is to develop sustainable financial services 
that operate at the local level with an organisational model that allows for scale-up and 
replicability. A few isolated success stories have tended to depend on expensive and 
lengthy external technical assistance in their formation stage. The innovative Financial 
Services Association (FSA) model offers a lower-cost and potentially sustainable 
solution. Over 100 FSAs operate in sub-Saharan Africa, with over 30,000 shareholders 
and over $1 million in share capital. 
The FSA model was pioneered by the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IF AD). DANIDA and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) also play 
an important role in establishing and supporting FSAs, relying heavily on FSA 
International, a consulting firm founded by Dr. Ahmad Jazayeri, formerly of IFAD. Since 
1994, FSAs have been introduced in Benin, the Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, Guinea, 
Mauritania, Uganda, Kenya and South Africa. 
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poorest (CGAP) wishes to explore the FSA model 
further, with a view to assessing its performance to date, identifying key components of 
the model and emerging issues, and assessing its potential for providing sustainable and 
accessible rural financial services. 
This review reflects information available at an early stage in the development of the 
FSA model, with the oldest FSAs in operation for less than five years. The review 
therefore inevitably draws out areas needing further information, and notes that the FSA 
model as yet is characterised more by potential than proven achievements. This review 
draws initial studies and reviews conducted in Uganda, Kenya, and Benin, and on 
statistics produced by KREP (Kenya) and I FAD (Benin). This still rather limited data and 
literature base is supplemented by perspective from the experience of FSAs in South 
Africa, Congo, and Guinea, and by telephone and email interviews with experts. 
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2. THE FSA MODEL 
2.1 Background and Context 
The FSA Model was developed by IFAD to address three specific challenges: locally-
based self-management, outreach and sustainability. FSAs are established at the 
community level, and are owned and managed by community members that buy shares 
in the FSA. In terms of outreach, FSAs can operate in unbanked rural communities that 
would not be viable for many other forms of financial service organisations. FSAs are 
characterised by simple systems and procedures, a limited range of financial services 
offered (presently low-technology savings and credit products),3 and a lack of a complex 
support structure. These characteristics enable FSAs to maintain low cost 
organisational structures and to rely on local management, and thus promote the 
sustainability of the FSA model. 
FSAs were originally envisaged as locally-owned and operated financial institutions 
directly linked to formal sector financial institutions. The legal form of FSAs was initially 
conceived as somewhere between a shareholding company and a cooperative. This lack 
of clarity has been reflected in the present legal form taken by FSAs, which varies by 
country and by individual FSA. FSAs in Kenya are registered as self-help groups within 
the Ministry of Culture and Social Services, while in Uganda only 4 of the 7 pilot FSAs 
have been registered at all (either as companies limited by shares or companies limited 
by guarantee). FSAs in West Africa tend to be unregistered associations with unlimited 
liability. 
The FSA model can be viewed in one sense as an initiative to apply microfinance 
techniques to rural areas, rather than emerging from an agricultural credit paradigm. 
From another perspective, the FSA model represents an attempt to build on the 
strengths of credit unions in rural areas, while compensating for their deficiencies. In 
many ways, the FSA model fits neither into the savings-first nor the credit-first approach, 
with both services offered, and offered more or less independently of each other. 
2.2 Structure 
Figure 1 presents a stylised organisational chart for FSAs and key external linkages, 
although the internal and external structure may vary between countries. The 
governance structure is fairly simple, relying on a General Assembly of shareholders, 
which elects a Board of Directors and an Audit Committee. The Board of Directors has 
the responsibility of the overall management of the FSA, while the General Assembly 
has the power to approve and confirm changes to policies, set interest rates, approve 
annual budgets and annual dividends, fix the share-value, and elect or dismiss any 
officeholder. The Board appoints a Manager and a Cashier, and nominates a Credit 
Committee from among its members. The Manager reports to the Board, and the Board 
reports to the General Assembly of the shareholders. 
The donor-funded support unit provides services such as training, information exchange 
and centralised purchasing, as well as carrying out a monitoring role. The type and form 
of support unit varies by country, with K-REP (a leading microfinance bank and NGO) 
3 Although some Kenyan FSAs have begun to experiment with product innovation, for example 
through introducing salary and pension payment facilities. 
3 
taking on the role of the support unit in Kenya, a local NGO carrying out this function in 
Benin, and a Project Management Unit (PMU) set-up by DFID acting as the support unit 
in Uganda. 
Linkages to formal sector financial institutions were originally conceived as an important 
component of the FSA model. FSAs would first graduate to a financial intermediary for 
other financial institutions (for example undertaking the payment of salaries and 
pensions), and then move on to secure loans from other financial or development 
institutions and act as a local retailer. However, in most countries where FSAs operate, 
links with banks remain poorly developed. 
Figure 1. FSA Organisational Chart 
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The profile of average FSAs in Benin and Uganda is presented in Table 1. The rural 
community-based nature of the FSAs is evident, in the scale achieved, outreach, and the 
size of average shareholding. The figures for average capital per shareholder, loan 
portfolio, and savings deposits for FSAs in Benin remain significantly lower than for the 
Ugandan FSAs, which may indicate that there are factors inhibiting the success of the 
Benin FSAs. lt should be noted, however, that the Ugandan FSAs are on average older 
and more mature institutions, established in 1997, while a third of FSAs in Ben in only 
began operating in 1999. This difference in operational age may partially explain the 
relative size differences between the two FSAs, as lending operations have not yet built 
up volume and poor initial financial FSA performance discourages higher levels of share 
investment. 
Table 1. Profile of an average FSA in Benin and Uganda 
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Uganda Ben in 
(Dec 99) (Apr 00) 
Number of shareholders 299 244 
Outreach Max. 20 km Max. 7 km 
Capital $10,200 $2,700 
Av. Capital per shareholder $34 $11 
Loan Portfolio Outstanding $10,200 $2,400 
Savings Deposits $2,000 $660 
3. FSA PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 
FSAs offer savings and credit services, and rely on member share capital as the main 
source of funds. FSAs do not yet fit within the regulatory framework of recognised 
financial intermediaries such as banks or savings and credit cooperatives, and therefore 
the scope for on-lending from deposits is limited. While savings and credit cooperatives 
are generally borrower-driven, FSAs seem to be primarily investor-driven. While credit 
union and savings and credit cooperative policies tend to be favourable to borrowers, 
FSAs have relatively high interest rates on loans. 
Since FSAs are not subject to such strong pressures to reduce lending rates, the rates 
charged by FSAs can - in theory at least - match supply and demand for funds more 
closely. Assuming that alternative pressures do not become dominant in FSAs, for 
example through the concentration of shareholding in a few investors, FSAs should be 
able to solve the rationing problem faced by credit unions by adjusting interest rates to 
balance supply and demand for funds. 
Loan size is linked to size of shareholdings, with predefined upper limits of up to either 
10% or 15% of the total loan fund, or $200 in the case of FSAs in Ben in. Shares in 
Kenyan FSAs are sold for 300 Kenyan Shillings each, equivalent to about $4; the 
smallest loans may fall as low as $10. Average loan sizes are higher, as larger 
shareholders often receive priority in accessing the limited FSA funds available for 
lending. The Ugandan FSAs report chronic shortages of loan funds, despite a fairly rapid 
turnover (four months is a common loan term). 
FSAs use individual lending methodologies, although some FSAs are experimenting with 
solidarity group lending on a small scale. Required guarantees include pledged goods 
and guarantors, although a very broad range of goods can be pledged. Loans can be 
used for any purpose, but the short-term (terms are commonly between 3 and 6 months) 
and high-cost nature of the loans (with nominal monthly interest rates between 8% and 
12%) means that loans are more suited to trading activities than longer term-investments 
(see Table 2). Common uses of loans in Kenya include school fees, trading and retailing 
and crop fertiliser, while in Benin FSAs cite agriculture, processing and trade as the most 
common uses for credit. 
The relatively high interest rates on lending promote operational sustainability, and rapid 
access to loans may partially offset the potential disincentive of high financial borrowing 
costs. The loan analysis and approval process is facilitated by the small size of the FSAs 
and the narrow range of loan products offered (in many cases only one). However, 
limited available loan funds restrict access, as does the dominance of larger 
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shareholders, who, in some cases, monopolise the available funds through repeat 
lending to themselves. 
FSAs do not value savings as a financial service and offer zero interest on deposits, 
while some charge transaction fees on withdrawals or limit the maximum size of 
allowable deposits. Only 26% of shareholders of Kenyan FSAs used deposit services as 
of November 1999, but this figure has since risen notably to over 40%. The ratio of 
deposits to loan portfolio for the FSAs in Uganda and Benin is only 20% and 28% 
respectively. This ratio between deposits and outstanding loans reflects the present 
situation where FSAs (except for some Kenyan FSAs) rely on share capital for loanable 
funds, and have not yet progressed to financial intermediation of savings. 
The terms for deposit facilities offered by FSAs encourage the temporary deposit of 
traders' earnings rather than longer-term savings accumulation. By providing safe and 
secure storage for temporary deposits, FSAs play a role in the functioning of the local 
market system. In theory, FSAs could price such a facility at a more realistic level, to 
reflect the costs of providing the service as well its value to traders. 
Linkages with banks are not being sufficiently utilised to provide savers with a return on 
their deposits. Bank branches in towns could be used to store the deposit funds, both in 
sight accounts (for reasons of security) and in fixed term deposit accounts (to earn a 
return on the funds), and K-REP has assisted several Kenyan FSAs to store idle deposit 
funds in fixed term deposits. A few Kenyan FSAs - again with the assistance of K-REP 
- have started to use deposit funds to invest in government securities. The unproductive 
utilisation of deposit monies characteristic of the majority of FSAs may reflect a mutually 
reinforcing dynamic, where low deposit levels discourage FSAs from incurring the costs 
of transferring funds between the community and the bank branch in town, as well as a 
general lack of financial expertise and awareness on behalf of FSA boards and 
management. 
Existing limits to organisational and managerial capacity notwithstanding, research on 
the financial service needs of the FSA shareholders would assist the development of a 
set of products more tailored to varying client profiles and needs. Low levels of uptake of 
deposit facilities and the below-expected lending performance, should be examined. 
FSAs need savings products that meet their members' demand to increase the levels of 
deposits. However, this objective will remain unattractive to FSAs unless they are able 
to secure returns on those funds that cover the costs associated with offering improved 
savings products. Enhanced links with banks and cooperatives could offer the means of 
earning returns on deposits. Agreements with regulatory authorities that place FSAs 
within regulatory and monitoring frameworks, and facilitate the mediation of member 
savings, would also provide an increased incentive for FSAs to offer improved deposit 
facilities. 
Table 2. Financial Services a 
FSAs FSAs FSAs 
Uganda Kenya Ben in 
(Dec 1999) (June 2000) (April 2000) 
Loans 
Average Outstanding Loan 
I 
$10,200 
I 
-
I 
$2,400 
Portfolio 
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I 
Maximum loan size Not > 15% of FSA loan Up to 4x share Min.$20 
fund investment & not > 1 0% Max $200 
of FSA loan fund 
Average loan size - $41 $40 
Maximum loan term 9 months 3 months for 1st loan 4 months 
then 8 months for next 
Average loan term 3 months 3 months most common 1-4 months range 
Interest Rate 144%b 120% 96% 
(nominal annual) 
APR 205% 127% 139% c 
Loan Methodology Individual loans Mostly individual loans. Individual loans 
Small % group loans 
Deposits 
Average deposits outstanding $2,000 $1,500 $660 
Nominal interest rate on 0% 0% 0% 
deposits 
Charges on withdrawals? 3% on each withdrawal Some FSAs charge -
small transaction fees 
(between 5-12 cents) 
Vol. Deposits/ 20% - 28% 
Vol. Loans outstanding 
a FSAs are young institutions, with those in Kenya, Uganda, and Benin only being set up since 1997. Studies 
with data on FSAs are relatively scarce, and the data presented in Table 3 and elsewhere in this review 
reflect the available information. 
bOne FSA has reduced its nominal annual interest rate to 120% 
c The available literature and data does not indicate whether FSAs in Benin calculate interest payments on 
the declining outstanding balance or on a 'flat' basis. lt is assumed that the 'flat' method is used, as is the 
case for the Ugandan FSAs. 
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I 
I 
4. 0UTREACH 
Table 3 presents some key outreach indicators, with some background information on 
the country included to give a wider context to FSA performance. 
Table 3. Outreach 
FSAs FSAs FSAs 
Uganda Kenya Ben in 
(Dec 1999) (June 2000) (April 2000) 
GNP/capita $310 $350a $380a 
Population Density (/sq.km) 105 5P 54 a 
Institution Profile 
Date earliest FSA established 1997 1997 1997 
No.FSAs 7 43 47 
Total Shareholder Equity $71,600 $171,000 $126,000 
Total Loans Outstanding $71,300 - $112,000 
Total Deposits Outstanding $14,100 $64,000 $30,800 
(net balance) 
Clientele 
No. shareholders/members 2,091 9,000 12,100 
%women 25-40% (est.) 45% 40% 
a Kenya and Benin figures for GNP/capita and population density are for 31 December, 1999. 
FSAs seem to offer good potential for scale-up. The rate of growth in the number of 
FSAs is particularly notable. In Benin, a total of 47 FSAs have been established in the 
last four years, while in Kenya the figure is 43 over the same period (although only 
seven have been set up in Uganda). Between 1997 and April 2000 over 6,000 loans 
were disbursed by the 47 FSAs in Benin, for a total of $421,000. The Benin FSAs had a 
total amount of paid-up equity of $126,000, while the figure for the Ugandan FSAs was 
$71,600. The 7 FSAs in Uganda had a total loan portfolio as of end-1999 of $71,300, 
while the outstanding loan portfolio for FSAs in Benin as of April 2000 was $112,000. 
These comparisons between FSAs in Uganda and Benin indicate that rapid growth in 
numbers of FSAs has been a feature in Benin, while in Uganda the growth in scale of 
individual FSAs has been more significant. 
While individual FSAs are still relatively small, the scale they have achieved is 
impressive when compared to similar rural finance models. Self-managed village 
savings and credit associations (CVECAs), viewed by some as a rural finance success 
story, operate in similar rural areas to FSAs, and are community and membership-
based.4 Established over a fourteen-year period, CVECAs have 260 members on 
4 CVECAs exist in Mali, Burkina Faso, Madagascar, Sao Tome, and the Gambia. 
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average, a loan portfolio of $7,700, and deposits of $3,200. After less than four years, an 
average FSA in Uganda has almost 300 shareholders (377 in an average Kenyan FSA), 
a loan portfolio of over $10,000, and total deposits of $2,000. 
The type and level of financial service utilised varies according to the profile of the FSA 
member. Loans may be accessible to all - depending on suitable guarantees and 
collateral being offered - but the size of loan is linked to the size of an individual's 
shareholding. The size of loans received therefore tends to be larger for better-off 
clients. 
Both the poorer and wealthier sections of the rural communities appear under-
represented within the membership of FSAs. Initial reviews of FSAs seem to indicate 
the following pattern, using a subdivision of village members under the categories rich, 
upper middle, lower middle, and poor: 
Rich: 
Upper middle: 
Lower middle: 
Poor: 
Few join the FSA, as they believe that it is not a sound or secure 
financial institution, and they can afford to take their money to banks 
in towns. The wealthier village members often demand larger loans 
than the FSA can provide, so those that do join tend to do so more as 
an investment with future dividends in mind. 
Need working capital to expand their businesses, and therefore buy 
shares to access loans. Less interested in savings. 
More interested in savings (or safekeeping of funds) facilities than 
shares, which are too illiquid to be used in emergencies. Also 
interested in loans, but may not have the required collateral. 
Rarely join FSAs, as the need to invest share capital and pledge 
guarantees to access loans is both demanding and potentially 
onerous. 
A breakdown of the clientele of the FSAs in Benin suggests that 44% of small 
shareholders have accessed loans, while this figure rises to 68% of small-medium 
shareholders, and falls to 29% for medium-large shareholders.5 These data confirm that 
larger shareholders are more interested in dividends on share investments than in 
accessing loans, and may help explain the persistence of high interest rates on loans: 
increased income from lending activities contributes to higher dividends. 
Early studies also indicate that, at least in Uganda, there is some overlap between users 
of FSAs and users of banks, a feature that may result from the early stage of 
development of the FSAs, with better-off persons in the community joining first. A 
comparative study of rural finance institutions assessed the profile of the clientele of 
FSAs in East Africa as similar to that of savings and credit cooperatives in the same 
region. On the other hand, those FSAs located in more remote areas likely reach out to 
unbanked populations. 
5 Small shareholders are defined as having 1-5 shares, small-medium as having 6-10 shares, 
and medium-large as having more than 11 shares. 
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The FSA model was envisaged as being open to women. FSAs generally have at least 
two women on the Board, and one of the two staff members, the manager and the 
cashier, should normally be a woman. However, women's participation levels fall below 
50% (comparable to those of CVECAs, and higher than the 15-20% typical of East 
African savings and credit cooperatives). Women participate at much higher levels in 
village banking programs. Also, the "African Small' group of microfinance institutions 
that report to the MicroBanking Bulletin (2000) show an average rate as high as 92.5%.6 
The relatively low level of participation of women as FSA shareholders may reflect socio-
cultural factors, combined with more restrictive access requirements for loans than in 
alternative informal savings and loan mechanisms. Women may also prefer to save 
small amounts in a tontine or other club-based group that provides rotating access to 
credit, rather than saving in an FSA, CVECA, or similar organisation. 
In order for FSAs to achieve greater scale and outreach, product diversification is 
needed, with products more tailored to the needs of the wider FSA membership. This 
can be achieved in part through improved links with formal financial institutions. 
Improved links with banks could enable FSAs to offer money transfer services, the 
payment of pensions and salaries, and other links to banking services. The costs of 
offering more attractive deposit facilities could be offset by the increased returns with 
banks or cooperatives, financial investments, or through on-lending deposit funds. The 
role of the support units is a key one, as FSAs require initial assistance in negotiating 
and managing links with formal financial institutions and offering more complex financial 
products. The diversification of services on offer would help extend and deepen outreach 
to poorer clientele. 
6 The nine 'African Small' institutions have loan portfolios of less than $1 million, and low average 
loan balances compared to FSAs. 
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5. INSTITUTIONAL SUSTAINABILITY 
FSAs can reach profitability in a relatively short timescale, generally within the first two 
years of existence. While financial sustainability is very much attainable by FSAs, 
providing that minimum levels of scale are achieved and that loan losses are kept under 
tight control, long-term institutional sustainability depends also on factors such as: 
• The level and type of competition from other financial service providers 
• The strength of internal governance structures 
• Links with the formal financial sector 
• The significance of donor support 
5.1 Financial Sustainability 
FSAs reach cost recovery levels in a relatively short period, as shown by the key 
sustainability indicators in Table 4. Many of the Kenyan FSAs generated a profit within 
the first two years of operation, before key non-cash expenses such as loan losses or 
depreciation are taken into account. A K-REP audit of FSAs in 1999 indicated that some 
FSAs face losses as a result of bad debts, while others show good profitability, leading 
to an increase in share value. 
FSA loan portfolio quality appears poor, even at this early stage in the development of 
the FSAs. Portfolio at Risk figures average about 25% in the Ugandan and Kenyan 
FSAs, although these figures are somewhat unreliable, due primarily to the low level of 
systems capacity in many FSAs and relatively untrained staff and Audit Committee 
members. Initial problems have been encountered with inadequately skilled staff and 
Audit Committee members, and associated weaknesses in accounting and reporting 
practices. Cases where Board members abuse their positions by falling behind on loan 
repayments and even 'rolling-over' loans, have been noted in Ugandan FSAs. Poor 
initial loan analysis by the Credit Committees can lead to problems with loan 
repayments, and in some cases the Kenyan FSAs did not follow procedures laid out by 
K-REP. 
Operating efficiency seems good, with operating costs for each unit lent already 
comparable to CVECAs (Kenyan FSAs record an operating efficiency figure of 0.18 
compared to 0.17 for CVECAs ). Jazayeri of FSA International projects that the cost per 
dollar lent by FSAs falls from $0.23 in the first year to as low as six cents in year five. 
Not only does the FSA model seem to offer relatively efficient lending, it also promises 
less complex support structures than those needed by CVECAs or credit unions (such 
as FECECAM, the Federation of Agricultural Savings and Loan Cooperatives, in Benin 
or KERUSSU, the Federation of Rural Savings and Credit Cooperatives, in Kenya). 
The profitability figures achieved at this early stage in the operation of the FSAs in 
Uganda and Kenya confirm the expectation that FSAs can achieve a respectable return 
on assets and equity, considering the low operating costs, high effective interest rates 
for lending and zero interest rates paid on deposits. However, while the FSA model has 
been seen as relatively low maintenance in the sense of the amount and length of 
external assistance needed, recent studies on FSAs in East Africa indicate that external 
support is more fundamental to the success of the model than was first thought. 
Technical assistance is costly, and if the cost of the technical assistance was factored 
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into the sustainability calculations, the FSAs' financial situation would appear less 
optimistic. 
Table 4. Sustainability Indicators 
FSAs FSAs 
Uganda Kenya 
(Dec 1999) (April 2000) 
Sustainabi/ity 
Operational Sustainability 173% 126%a 
!(total revenue/total operating costs) 
Efficiency 
Operating Costs/Amount disbursed 
' 
n/a 0.18 
Profitability 
Return on Assets 21% 31%b 
Loan Portfolio 
Portfolio at risk 23% 24% 
(1 day) 
a When defaulted loans are not taken into account, the figure rises to about 200%. 
b Return on Loan Portfolio, rather than Return on Assets. Figures are for 10 of the 43 Kenyan FSAs only. 
5.2 Competition 
FSA rates on loans and deposits appear to be uncompetitive compared to other financial 
service providers (such as savings and credit cooperatives and Rotating Savings and 
Credit Associations, or ROSCAs). As a result, FSAs might struggle in competitive 
environments to attract those wishing to borrow or save. However, it appears that in the 
Kenyan case the majority of members of the FSAs also use services of other financial 
service organisations, such as informal savings clubs, ROSCAs, NGOs and even 
commercial banks. This use of multiple services suggests that FSAs can also function in 
environments with competition from other financial service providers, although further 
investigation in other countries is needed to confirm this. The types and terms of 
services offered by FSAs may be more important than the existence of competitors. 
FSAs offer rapid access to loans, an important potential link to the formal financial 
sector, a place to keep deposits, and a source of larger loan amounts (depending on 
shareholding size). 
Those interested in a longer-term relationship with a financial service provider may 
favour the ability to 'buy in' to the FSA through share investments and the link between 
voting rights and shareholding. Better-off members of the community may be 
increasingly attracted to invest over time, as FSA profitability improves. FSAs offer the 
potential to earn an attractive rate of return on relatively small amounts of share capital, 
in an environment with a limited range of investment opportunities. However, improved 
terms on deposit facilities and access to banking services offered through links with the 
formal financial sector would go a long way towards making FSAs more attractive to the 
wider community relative to competitors. 
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5.3 Governance 
One of the principal strengths of the FSA model is that it retains the advantages of a 
membership-based structure while offering solutions to some of the governance-related 
problems common to credit unions or savings and credit cooperatives. Appendix 11 
contains a more comprehensive comparison between the FSA model and savings and 
credit cooperatives. 
Voting rights in FSAs vary according to shareholding, thus strengthening governance 
within the organisation. Cooperatives or credit unions can face the problem that the 
elected director and contracted management do not represent the interests of the 
membership. Where voting rights are dispersed equally among many members, as in 
credit unions, it is costly for all members to frequently monitor the decision-makers, and 
most owners lack the skills and information required to do so effectively anyway. 
While this problem can to some extent be addressed by enforcement of institutional 
rules that define the roles and responsibilities of the actors involved in the governance of 
the credit union, the FSA model goes further. Linking voting rights to shareholdings 
allows those with a larger financial stake in the institution to have a greater voice and 
influence within the FSA, unlike the case of credit unions. This type of representation 
should lead to more effective governance, as the greater incentive that these 
shareholders have to monitor and influence decision-makers is to some degree matched 
by their capacity to do so.7 
The for-profit nature of the FSAs offers the opportunity to introduce profit-related 
incentives for management and board performance, and dividends to reward 
shareholders. FSAs in Uganda and Kenya have exploited this potential, introducing 
commission-based remuneration for Board members and staff. At the close of the 
financial year, the profit made by the FSA is apportioned between reinvestment in the 
FSA, operating costs, and dividends. Mature FSAs in Benin typically allocate 20% of 
annual profits to dividends. 
Notwithstanding the proportional shareholding structure and profit orientation, the 
reviews of experience to date in Uganda and Kenya suggest that the FSA model may 
still suffer from many of the governance problems that commonly affect credit union 
models. Key internal governance issues noted include: 
• Possible risk of capture by educated and erudite village elite 
• Dominant chairpersons, and conflict between boards and managers 
• Board and/or staff taking decisions without approval of the membership 
• Board and staff members having loans in arrears 
• Limited loan funds dominated by a few, loans being 'rolled-over' by larger 
shareholders, and concealed delinquency problems 
The following appear to be the principal causes of these governance problems: 
7 Kenyan FSAs limit voting rights to a maximum of ten votes per shareholder. 
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• A lack of awareness on the part of the General Assembly of their responsibilities and 
powers, with members not fully understanding the rules and regulations of the FSA 
• A lack of transparency, particularly with regard to lending decisions 
• Poor understanding of the potential link between delinquency and poor financial 
performance of the FSA 
• Inadequate internal monitoring and supervision 
The degree to which blame should be attached to internal factors (FSAs not functioning 
properly, poor internal supervision), or to external factors (a lack of external monitoring 
and supervision) needs further exploration. The presence of incentive systems, 
procedures and controls, and a link between voting rights and shareholding, should 
combine to promote good governance. Therefore, a breakdown in the intended internal 
functioning of the FSA model would seem to be the primary factor behind such 
problems. 
5.4 Formal Sector Linkages 
Currently, FSA links with the banking sector are either non-existent or still in the early 
stages of development. Links with banks and credit unions could allow FSAs to offer 
access to insurance services and term deposits, payment transfer services, and 
payment of pensions and salaries. lt is only in Kenya, with the assistance of K-REP, that 
this potential has begun to be explored. This is due in part to a lack of financial sector 
knowledge and familiarity on the part of FSA management and board members. Many 
FSAs also express scepticism about the formal banking sector, and several FSAs in 
Uganda have lost money and suffered a consequent drop-off in new shareholders after 
commercial bank partners closed down. FSAs face travel, time, and transaction costs in 
dealing with banks, and the volume of transactions needs to be sufficiently high to make 
linkages worthwhile. 
Banks, on the other hand, may not place sufficient value on the collateral offered by 
FSAs on potential loans (although FSAs are in a relatively strong position as regards 
equity and associated low leverage), and may simply not see the benefit of the effort and 
cost involved in setting up linkages with FSAs. Until FSAs become larger and more 
widespread, and perhaps also until there are increased levels of competition in the 
banking sector, this situation may continue. 
Bank linkages are more developed in the case of the South African Financial Service 
Cooperatives (FSCs), which are a variant of FSAs. FSCs are linked via an electronic 
funds transfer system to the formal banking sector, and their clients can transfer funds 
between urban bank accounts and rural FSA accounts. This represents an important first 
step towards providing access to banking services in rural communities. FinaSol, an 
association established in 1999 with the specific purpose of promoting and supporting 
FSCs, has played a key role in this linkage. FinaSol provided the technical support and 
funds to ensure that FSCs have the systems and personnel capacity needed to link with 
banks. Higher levels of innovation and competition in the South African banking sector 
may help explain the unusual level of interest in FSAs on the part of commercial banks, 
although the role of FinaSol may be equally important. 
Individual FSAs that develop close linkages with the formal financial sector may 
effectively become payment windows for banks. In such a context FSAs risk losing their 
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internal organisational dynamics. The influence of the link bank may overshadow that of 
the General Assembly and Board, and the focus of the FSAs may well shift from 
providing savings facilities and access to loans, to providing banking services on behalf 
of the link bank. However, the value of an extension of banking services to an unbanked 
rural community may equal or exceed the value to the community of the limited range of 
services being previously offered by the FSA. This is an issue that merits further study. 
5.5 Legal and Regulatory Environment 
The legal nature of the FSA model will need further clarification, since key features of the 
FSA model do not fit within standard banking and cooperative regulatory and 
supervisory structures. FSAs are similar to banks and other shareholder-owned 
companies, as they are shareholder-owned and for-profit. In this sense, FSAs may fit 
under Company Laws, with the Companies Registry Agency and the Securities and 
Exchange Agency (or their equivalents in each country) the appropriate regulatory 
agencies. Those Ugandan FSAs that have registered have done so as companies 
limited by shares or guarantee. However, such a designation would curtail any plans for 
intermediation of savings by FSAs in the future, and limit FSAs to lending and investor-
oriented activities. Further, the capacity and interest of such agencies to regulate small 
rural-based FSAs is also questionable. 
On the other hand, FSAs also resemble informal self-help savings and credit schemes, 
as they are small in scale, community-based, and offer only a limited range of financial 
services. Indeed, Kenyan FSAs have registered as self-help groups under the Ministry of 
Culture and Social Services. Kenyan FSAs can on-lend savings to members, and 
although in most cases they do not on-lend significant amounts of savings, one Kenyan 
FSA has decided to use 25% of its savings to supplement its loan funds. lt may therefore 
be that reform of financial sector regulatory agencies and laws to accommodate FSAs 
may not make sense. 
CVECAs offer another model. They also differ from cooperatives and credit unions, as 
the General Assembly of a CVECA is composed of all the members of the village, not 
only the members of the CVECA. CVECAs are regulated under the PARMEC law, 
which governs mutual and cooperative savings and credit institutions.8 Non-cooperative 
institutions can sign five-year agreements with the Ministry of Finance, entitling them to 
conduct business and place them under government control. CVECAs have taken 
advantage of this provision. This arrangement is 'negotiable', and depends more on the 
goodwill of the Ministry of Finance than on the actual provisions of the law. Such an 
arrangement offers hope for a solution to the regulatory situation of the FSAs, but may 
not be ideal due to its uncertain legal position. 
A further alternative entails conversion to the cooperative model. This option offers the 
primary advantage of rapid acquisition of a legal form that allows financial intermediation 
of deposits, up to now a major weakness of the FSA model. However, FSAs would lose 
many of their distinctive and innovative features upon conversion. Some of the central 
features of the FSA model were designed specifically to address problems with the 
cooperative model, as has been discussed elsewhere in this review. 
6 The PARMEC law was developed by the West African Central Bank, and applies to the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) zone. 
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No existing framework fits the FSAs perfectly, and specialised laws may not be practical 
or beneficial. Country-specific research and consultations are needed to determine 
suitable legal and regulatory frameworks for FSAs that allow for financial intermediation 
while preserving the unique features of the model. 
5.6 Donor Support 
The FSA model would seem to promote good asset management and effective 
governance, and to allow FSAs to function successfully with only limited initial donor-
funded assistance. FSAs have received much lower levels of technical assistance and 
donor funding than some other financial service models in rural Africa that are 
considered as success stories. The CVECA model for example, was developed with 
donor support over a period of more than ten years. However, initial and ongoing donor 
support has proved essential in developing the FSA model and establishing individual 
FSAs. Participatory analysis in Benin revealed a close link between the success of the 
FSAs and the intensity of follow-up provided by the donor-established support unit. 
Recent studies for DFID on FSAs in East Africa indicate that technical assistance may 
be needed for several years, and that external monitoring may always be needed. 
The FSAs' status as for-profit and shareholder-owned institutions may eventually 
address the current loan portfolio quality problems. Those FSAs with significant 
problems will either respond positively to a situation whereby losses persuade 
shareholders to withdraw their investments, and institute the necessary reforms, or they 
will close. In other FSAs, as the membership and management become familiar with the 
FSA model, the situation may improve on its own. There is a close connection between 
share dividends and profit-based salaries and benefits on one hand, and on-time loan 
repayments on the other. As understanding of the FSA model increases among 
shareholders, as shareholders become more active in General Assemblies, and as 
management and staff become more competent in their roles, loan portfolio 
management and repayment performance may improve. However, to date it seems to 
be largely those FSAs that have received technical assistance for training staff and 
raising awareness among members that have made progress in improving portfolio 
management and reducing loan losses. 
Much of the donor assistance has come through local NGOs or through support units, 
rather than directly to FSAs, thus increasing the cost-effectiveness of the assistance and 
avoiding the potentially prohibitive cost of providing individualised assistance to each 
FSA. K-REP has actively supported the development of FSAs in Kenya, with financial 
and technical support from DFID. K-REP carries out the initial market research and 
programme promotion, contributes to capital expenditure in the first year of operations of 
an FSA, and provides technical assistance (initially assisted by FSA International}. DFID 
has directly supported the Ugandan Project Management Unit (PMU) and external 
technical assistance from FSA International. A local NGO in Benin, SYFIPRO (Systeme 
financier de Proximite ), acts as facilitator for the FSAs and prepares other NGOs for the 
task, with support from IFAD through its PAGER and PROMIC projects. IFAD covers 
initial equipment and building costs, and SYFIPRO provides training and monitoring for 
the first three to four years of each FSA's existence. 
IFAD estimates that the total direct cost of establishing an FSA in Benin equals about 
$12,600, including the costs of building the office, buying equipment, and providing 
technical support. This figure may exclude a portion of the indirect costs incurred, such 
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as the market research done prior to FSA location and development of training 
materials. The average cost for setting-up an FSA in Kenya has been estimated at 
$5,000. K-REP records an average figure of $15,900 per FSA for the costs of its 
support and assistance to the FSAs in Kenya over their initial years of operation. A high-
end estimate for the full cost of setting-up a FSA, including indirect costs, is provided by 
Jazayeri of FSA International, who estimates a figure of $60,000 for establishing FSAs 
and taking them to full autonomy (i.e. the stage where they could pay for technical 
services on their own). 
While the figures for donor support may appear quite low, FSAs are relatively small 
entities, with average share capital of between $3,000 and $10,000 and outreach of 
under 300. More detailed cost-benefit analysis is needed, comparing donor investment 
to the resulting outcomes and impact. Alternative methods of financing the establishment 
of FSAs, and the provision of technical support and training, need to be explored. Three 
possible solutions are outlined below: 
i. Provision of initial technical and material assistance by the support units as a loan, 
which is then repaid by the FSA to the support unit on reaching profitability. A donor 
would cover only the costs of establishing and capitalising the support unit. 
ii. Ownership of the support unit by FSAs, with membership fees covering the costs of 
operations. This would help ensure that the support unit remained responsive to the 
FSAs' needs, and would assist in promoting its sustainability. 
iii. Creation of a 'franchisee-owned franchiser', or AFSA (Association of FSAs), as 
advanced by Jazayeri, and similar to the franchising system developed by FinaSol 
with Financial Service Cooperatives (FSCs) in South Africa. An AFSA would provide 
the training and supervision package for a fee, and sometimes for an equity position 
in the franchisee's business. The franchisees - the FSAs - would agree to maintain 
standards and to respect the brand name. The AFSA could offer the same range of 
services as the support unit, with an improved incentive for ensuring that FSAs 
operate effectively. The FSAs could swap a percentage of their shares for shares in 
the AFSA, and pay a percentage of their monthly income for services. 
Experience to date would suggest the following valid areas for donor intervention and 
support that ensure a positive benefit/cost relationship and avoid the distortion by donor 
funds of the FSA model: 
• Assisting in initial market research and/or in determining suitable market conditions 
for the establishment of FSAs. 
• Providing training and technical assistance to support units. 
• Researching the financial service needs of the FSA shareholders. 
Donors could usefully fund research that explains the low levels of uptake of savings 
deposits by FSA members, and that assists FSAs to offer a more diversified range of 
financial services. Action research could explore and develop low cost and 
straightforward deposit and loan products that appeal to a wider section of the rural 
communities where FSAs operate. Examples include loan products that meet the needs 
of the poorer segments of the FSA membership, or savings products that promote 
capital accumulation and investment. If the introduction of more attractive savings 
products led to increased volume and longer-term deposits, then FSAs would have a 
greater incentive to invest a proportion of the deposits. This dynamic in turn would 
constitute an important initial step towards developing linkages with the formal financial 
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sector. As FSAs grow in volume, more formal market mechanisms for the exchange of 
members' shares could be developed, thus providing further incentives for good 
governance and good financial performance. 
There may also be a case for re-thinking the FSA model, and introducing stricter controls 
on board elections, board and management borrowing, and the independence of 
management/board relationships. Further research is needed into such internal 
governance issues. lt may be that the structure of shareholders' voting and lending 
rights should be revised to ensure that the needs of the whole membership are 
represented, without over-diluting the positive incentives for share investors. 
The following areas are less valid for donor support, and may even cause harm: 
• Providing technical assistance and support directly to FSAs. 
• Developing complex, bureaucratic, and/or expensive support structures and 
networks. 
• Subsidised credit lines to FSAs for on-lending. 
An effective support unit is important to maximise the cost effectiveness and impact of 
donor support. Donors need to push support units towards sustainability from an early 
stage, to avoid external dependence and prolonged or excessive donor funding. 
Support units should be flexible and streamlined, with complex support structures 
avoided (such as those associated with CVECAs and the Credit Union networks found in 
West Africa and elsewhere). The relationship between FSAs and support units should be 
transaction-based, with the support units responding to demand from the FSAs rather 
than to donor policy. Mechanisms for charging for support units' services and for 
allocating costs need to be further developed and more widely introduced. 
Donor support in the form of subsidised credit lines to FSAs would risk distorting the 
structure of ownership and incentives within the FSA model. One of the strengths of the 
FSA model is that sources of funds can be shares bought by members of the 
community, savings (depending on legal and institutional capacity issues), and loans 
from commercial sources, backed by the FSA's own equity and assets. External 
subsidised funding would lead to artificially high returns ripe for capture by the more 
influential clients, or to unsustainably low interest rates on lending. The influence of the 
donor on the FSA's policies and management might also grow, at the expense of the 
shareholders' interests. 
6. ASSESSMENT AND IMPLICATIONS FOR DONORS 
FSAs offer increased access to financial services in relatively remote or small rural 
communities. They improve the outreach of the financial sector in rural areas, add depth 
to the rural financial market, and offer potential solutions to governance and 
sustainability problems. FSAs have the potential to operate sustainably in rural areas 
not covered by existing microfinance institutions (MFis) and cooperatives. FSAs can 
achieve financial sustainability relatively rapidly, although important caveats remain 
concerning the need for a healthy loan portfolio. 
Donors and potential investors wishing to examine the FSA model more closely may 
also be interested in: 1) the type of services offered, 2) the current and potential scale of 
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outreach, 3) the profile of those who benefit from FSA services, and 4) lingering 
questions on governance. As yet, FSAs have offered a restricted range of services. 
FSAs presently rely on members' capital as the principal source of funds, and mostly 
lack the technical and organisational capacity to broaden the range of services offered. 
Improving the range and terms of financial services offered makes good sense for both 
commercial and development considerations. By increasing the volume of transactions 
while maintaining efficient operations, FSAs could become more competitive by offering 
more favourable rates to savers and depositors while still ensuring investor returns. 
Access to banking services - through linkages with the banking sector - would also be 
an important competitive advantage for the FSAs. 
Individual FSAs may never grow substantially in scale, as they are limited by the 
population and economic activity levels of the rural centres in which they are located. 
Scale-up in terms of numbers of FSAs should perhaps be the key measure, rather than 
increases in the size of individual FSAs, and in Kenya and Benin an impressive number 
of FSAs have been established over the preceding four years. 
FSAs are shareholder bodies that exist for the benefit of the shareholders, not explicitly 
for the poor or for any other group. FSAs are principally investor-driven, reflected in high 
interest rates for borrowers, and zero interest rates for depositors. To date, FSAs have 
concentrated their efforts on the provision of expensive short-term credit to those who 
can offer collateral. The poorer sections of rural communities have tended not to join 
FSAs, and levels of participation by women are low relative to other community-based 
financial service providers. 
FSAs offer a simple yet potentially strong governance structure, and the scope for 
incentive-based remuneration and reward systems that promote good asset 
management and profitability. However, many FSAs face significant problems with poor 
or distorted governance and poor portfolio quality. These problems may be due to poor 
technical capacity within many FSAs, and to low levels of awareness among many FSA 
members of their rights and responsibilities. Continued external technical assistance and 
monitoring may be needed in many cases to address these problems, although the cost 
of this needs to be compared carefully with the potential resulting benefits and impacts. 
Donor credit lines and grants for on-lending would be an inappropriate means of donors 
encouraging scale-up, as these would dilute community ownership and distort the strong 
incentive systems that underpin the model. Donors wishing to support FSAs should 
instead concentrate on improving the FSA model, focusing particularly on the products 
and services offered, and the governance structures. Donors should strengthen the 
support units so that they can provide more effective technical assistance and training. 
Mechanisms should be developed to reduce the need for donor support to the support 
units over time, increase their sustainability, and reduce the level of donor subsidies 
needed for FSA start-up costs. 
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APPENDIX 11: SAVINGS AND CREDIT COOPERATIVES VS. THE FSA MODEL 
S & C Cooperative FSA 
Ownership structure Registered under the Cooperative Registered as civil associations or 
Laws or under the Bank and Financial companies 
Entity Laws 
Profit Orientation Non-profit but aiming at sustainability For-profit 
Share sale/valuation In some cases shares may be Shares can be sold at market 
redeemed at their nominal value, or value, which depends on the FSA 
alternatively shareholders wishing to balance sheet (although lack of 
leave simply net their shares off secondary markets at present 
against remaining loan balances inhibits this). FSAs agree to buy 
back shares after a specific period 
of time. 
Dividends Low or nominal Can be higher 
General Meetings Typically only Annual and occasional Annual plus Quarterly General 
Extraordinary General Meetings Meetings 
Voting Rights One person one vote In many cases (not all), depends 
on number of shares held (with a 
pre-set maximum) 
Board remuneration Usually voluntary Remunerated on the basis of 
profits made (in many cases) 
Management Fixed salaries or voluntary In many cases linked to 
remuneration profitability of the FSA 
Access to Loans Loan amount usually directly linked to Loan amount linked to size of 
amount deposited. shareholding. 
Interest Rates Generally relatively low interest rates Very low (if any) interest on 
for both savings and loans savings, and relatively high rates 
on loans. 
Source: adapted from DFID (2000) 
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